On May 4, 2010, the Ohio Supreme Court announced its decision in Jaques v. Manton*, 2010-Ohio-1838, holding that evidence of medical bill write-offs is admissible in personal injury lawsuits to which R.C. 2315.20 applies. Thus, in awarding damages, the jury is entitled to consider both the billed amount of medical expenses and any reduced amount that the medical providers accept as full payment.
In Robinson v. Bates*, 112 Ohio St.3d 17, 2006-Ohio-6362, 857 N.E.2d 1195, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the common-law collateral source rule, and held that “[b]ecause no one pays the write-off, it cannot possibly constitute payment of any benefit from a collateral source.” The Court therefore concluded that both the billed amount and any reduced amount accepted as full payment are admissible in determining the reasonable value of the plaintiff’s medical expenses.
Effective April 7, 2005, the Ohio General Assembly enacted R.C. 2315.20, which provides that evidence of collateral benefits is admissible in a tort action, subject to certain exceptions. One such exception is where the source of collateral benefits has a right of subrogation. The statute provides:
In any tort action, the defendant may introduce evidence of any amount payable as a benefit to the plaintiff as a result of the damages that result from an injury, death, or loss to person or property that is the subject of the claim upon which the action is based, except if the source of collateral benefits has … a contractual right of subrogation …
Although the statute had been enacted at the time of the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Robinson, the statute did not apply there because it took effect after the cause of action had accrued.
In cases governed by R.C. 2315.20, plaintiffs have argued that evidence of write-offs is inadmissible (despite Robinson) because medical insurers have a contractual right of subrogation. In Jaques v. Manton, the trial court and court of appeals accepted this argument, and held that evidence of medical expense write-offs was inadmissible. Thus, the jury was never informed that approximately two-thirds of the plaintiff’s medical bills had been written off (the providers had accepted $7,483.91 as full payment of bills totaling $21,874.80). The Ohio Supreme Court reversed, holding that write-offs are not benefits paid by a collateral source, and do not fall within the collateral source rule in the first instance:
Jaques argues that R.C. 2315.20, not Robinson, controls in this case and that the statute compels us to hold that evidence of write-offs is no longer admissible. We disagree. The general collateral-source rule in R.C. 2315.20 must apply before the subrogation exception of the statute can apply. The general rule pertains only to “evidence of any amount payable as a benefit to the plaintiff.” This formulation is no different substantively from the common-law rule described in Robinson ... as excluding only: “evidence of benefits paid by a collateral source.” Our common-law analysis from Robinson applies equally in the context of the statute.
The Court concluded that the reasonable value of a plaintiff’s medical expenses may be the amount billed by medical providers, the amount accepted as full payment, or some other amount that a jury determines.
There is an effort underway in the General Assembly to overturn Robinson by enacting House Bill 361, which plaintiffs’ attorneys have promoted. For the moment, however, the decision in Jaques should eliminate the confusion among Ohio trial courts as to the admissibility of medical bill write-offs in personal injury lawsuits.
FULL TEXT/PRINTABLE VERSION