McFee concerned the application of a uniform-length-of-service policy that provided employees were not eligible for any type of leave until they had been employed for a period of one year. A former employee sued her employer after being fired while on maternity leave only eight months after her employment began. The Court found the employment policy was “pregnancy blind,” and that in the absence of evidence of discrimination or pretext, a uniform-length-of-service requirement is not per se discriminatory.  

R.C. Chapter 4112 requires employers to treat pregnant employees the same for employment-related purposes as employees who are not pregnant but similar in their ability or inability to work. Pursuant to R.C. 4112.02, it is unlawful for an employer to discharge an employee because of pregnancy or a related condition without just cause.  

The statute does not invoke a per se ban on the termination of pregnant employees. Instead, the Ohio legislature enacted the statute as a means to ensure the equal not preferential treatment of pregnant employees.  

McFee set forth McDonnell Douglas as the analysis to be utilized by courts evaluating uniform-length-of-service policies where there is no direct evidence of discrimination. The McDonnell Douglas analysis was first articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), wherein the Supreme Court of the United States proposed a method for analyzing cases where direct evidence of discrimination is lacking. 

Under the rule, an employee has the burden of establishing a prima facie claim of discrimination. An employer may refute this evidence by "articulat[ing] some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.” McDonnell Douglas, at 402. The employee may overcome only by demonstrating the employer’s “legitimate” actions were pre-textual and motivated by discrimination.   

The Court also reconciled ambiguities in the interpretation of the Ohio Adm. Code 4112-5-05(G)(2), which provides:

Where termination of employment of an employee who is temporarily disabled due to pregnancy or a related medical condition is caused by an employment policy under which insufficient or no maternity leave is available, such termination shall constitute unlawful sex discrimination.

The Ohio Civil Rights Commission argued for the Court to interpret the Code as imposing a mandatory maternity leave requirement on employers. The McFee court refused, reasoning that this interpretation would expand the policy beyond that promulgated by the General Assembly in its enactment of R.C. 4112.02.

The Court held that Ohio Adm. Code 4112-5-05 (G) (2) is read to mean “that when an employee is otherwise eligible for leave, the employer cannot lawfully terminate that employee for violating a policy that provides no leave or insufficient leave for temporary disability due to pregnancy or a related condition.”